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The Prime Minister’s latest transparency commitments, set out in a letter of 7
th July, 2011, include 
the following: 
Opening up access to anonymised data from the National Pupil Database to help parents and pupils 
to monitor the performance of their schools in depth, from June 2012. This will enable better 
comparisons of school performance and we will look to strengthen datasets in due course 
Sentencing data by court will be published by November 2011, enabling the public to see exactly 
what sentences are being handed down in their local courts, and compare different courts on a wide 
range of measures. The data, anonymised, will include the age, gender and ethnicity of those 
sentenced, the sentence given, and the time taken at each stage from offence to completion of the 
case in court 
Data on performance of probation services and prisons including re-offending rates by offender and 
institution, to be published from October 2011 
The publication of these data is likely to be very important for the development of innovative 
services in areas such as education and criminal justice, and the government’s strong and abiding 
commitment to transparency should be applauded. 
However, as Kieron O’Hara advised in a report for the Cabinet Office earlier this year, Transparent 
Government, Not Transparent Citizens, there is an issue with anonymised databases. Databases are 
anonymised by removing identifiers (such as names, addresses, etc) from the data. However, it is 
sometimes possible, using auxiliary information, to piece together enough information from other 
sources to re-identify the data subjects (hence the term ‘jigsaw identification’). US legal scholar Paul 
Ohm has described the science and set out a worst-case legal scenario in a well-known paper; even if 
one does not endorse his vision, it is clear that there is a probably small but not well-understood risk 
of jigsaw identification with the inclusion of anonymised databases in a transparency programme, 
for three reasons. 
1.  The governing principles of the transparency programme preclude the possibility of 
controlling or withdrawing access to the data. 
2.  The risks of jigsaw identification grow with the amount of auxiliary information available to 
the identifier. Of course the amount of data on the World Wide Web grows annually, 
particularly thanks to information on social networking sites and local press coverage. The 
transparency programme is also likely to be a major contributor over time. 3.  Jigsaw identification is computationally complex. However, dramatic increases in computer 
power have lowered the barriers, and we can expect them to continue falling, so that soon 
even small, personal devices might be sufficient for someone to identify people, or disclose 
sensitive information about them, from anonymised data. 
Given the uncertainty in this area, it is important to develop and archive best practice in 
anonymisation. To that end, a group of academics, students and professional data security 
consultants worked with statisticians at the Ministry of Justice in order to ensure that the anonymity 
of the individual level reoffending and sentencing data would be as secure as possible. 
The risk 
The data would not include explicitly identifying data (such as names or ages). However, offenders 
could be identified, or disclosures made about them, if they had a unique combination of 
characteristics which could be matched against outside information. Groups of offenders sharing 
characteristics could also provide a route to disclosure; for example, if each member of a group has 
characteristics A, B, C and D, and a named individual with characteristics A, B and C can be placed 
within the group, then further facts about the individual could be deduced (viz, that he or she had 
characteristic D). 
The Ministry of Justice were of course aware of these risks, and were keen to minimise them. 
The method 
It was decided to test the risk of identification and disclosure, but that the tests would not be 
performed within or by the Ministry of Justice, in order to ensure a disinterested testing regime. 
Furthermore, the tests would include elements of creative thinking as a complement to computing 
power; this would help model real-world, less predictable risks. 
Three stages were involved. 
1. Within the Ministry of Justice, statisticians aggregated the data into ranges for each characteristic. 
Within the reoffending data, the characteristics were gender, age, offence, establishment/trust, 
previous offences, whether reoffended and number of reoffences. The ranges were widened in 
order to reduce the number of unique cases (with the reoffending data, this was down to a few 
dozen out of over 200,000 cases). 
2. The resulting reoffending dataset was passed to the academics, including the authors and Chris 
Skinner of the London School of Economics. Postgraduate students with relevant experience from 
the LSE, Royal Holloway and Southampton were recruited (at short notice, with little or no 
preparation) to try to identify anonymised subjects, or disclose further information about them. 
Guidance was issued in the form of a link to a technical paper about jigsaw identification, but the 
students were told they could use any method that they chose, and could ignore the methods in the 
guidance paper if they so wished. The students were required to sign confidentiality agreements. 
There was disclosure – not in one of the unique cases – as a result of matching the profile of an 
offender named on a local news website. Although the offender was not unique, because there was 
a match certain deductions about his/her reoffending data could be made. The students’ work had shown the possibility of disclosure, although not necessarily in high volumes. 
Certain details had proved important for the jigsaw effect, and so the MoJ statisticians further 
aggregated the data (removing information about the offence committed), and also removed all of 
the remaining unique cases. 
3. This newly-adjusted dataset was then passed to the data security specialists Detica, where a team 
led by Philip Whittall was able to determine that the finally released data were secure against this 
threat, and also to further specify the risk profile of the release. 
With regard to the sentencing data the approach was different, in accord with the different risk 
profile. The overwhelming majority of the details to be released were given in open court so 
disclosure or identification was less of a risk. However, it was absolutely essential to avoid 
(i) identification of any victim, and (ii) breach of a reporting restriction. The data were aggregated 
and anonymised according to risk – in particular grouping violent and sexual offences together to 
minimise the chance of a victim of a sex offence being identifiable. The test for the students with 
respect to this data was to see if they could identify someone where the details of the case were not 
already available on the Web or in newspapers. No student managed to do this. 
Conclusions 
The testing method, involving three diverse sources of testers, resulted in a greater understanding of 
the anonymised data and its properties. Groupthink was avoided, with the combination of MoJ 
statisticians, professional IT consultants and the students. The costs of the exercise were relatively 
low. 
The involvement of the students was important for three reasons. First, they brought some 
unorthodox methods into the tests. Second, their involvement mimicked that of ‘hackers’ in the real 
world, lacking professionalism and experience in large-scale data handling, but driven by the nature 
of the problem. Third, the short time given to them set a fairly high barrier, which at least one of 
them was able to cross. This indicated that the dataset in its original form contained risks which 
warranted detailed investigation. 
The exercise resulted in the MoJ statisticians having a much greater understanding of the properties, 
and the potential break points, of the data. They were able to make finer judgments about the level 
of aggregation consistent with preserving anonymity. This will be incorporated into the Privacy 
Impact Assessment covering these data releases. It will also of course feed into future data releases, 
which will allow the statisticians to try to balance data utility with the risk of jigsaw identification. 
As O’Hara wrote in his report, the transparency programme must retain public confidence if it is to 
succeed. If the public feels that its privacy will be compromised by transparency, then the 
programme itself will be at risk. This series of tests of MoJ data has demonstrated: 
i.  That privacy and transparency are compatible 
ii.  That methods for dealing with anonymised datasets can go beyond what Ohm has 
characterised as ‘anonymise-and-forget’ 
iii.  The value of precautionary testing for understanding the weak points of an anonymised 
dataset 
iv.  The value of creative thinking as a complement to computing power in this field v.  The respect for privacy amongst the officials tasked with delivering transparency 
The tests here were devised and carried out with very short notice. However, there is clearly a case 
for adopting similar precautionary testing procedures across government. 